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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, 
STATE • : -F I JTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
"I 
Plaint - . i l *^*~ respondent, 
v s 
so: NCJUIEN, Case No. 930156-CA 
Defendant and Appellant N Priority *T~ 
J U R I S D I C T I O N w xtxL C O J R x w r rtjnrJ^uuS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction this matter pursuant 
to the provisions ~-_ Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1990 as 
Amen* led) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Defendant contends that the trial <.•• ^-r -r^er - g 
1 hiH- 1 1. \... _ .. \idence of an unrelated _velt tnat oocu^ieu in 
Price, Utah to whici 'he Defendant could not be associated. 
-^ ^i^^j^A^^ ^yie issue on nppe.i I , tin I -mdrrnl cif n ' n i." :i s 
\ amission oi evidence UJUILI: Rule 404 (b; io a 
question of law ,xi : A- reviewed by the appellate court for 
correctness The ti: 2 a] coi irt' s under] yd ng f< : * • * * • 1 
s i ; - . .
 t . J "leference by the appellate C O U L L ai.a shou^a ^ m y be 
overruled when they are clearly erroneous. State v. O'Neil, 206 
Utah Adv. Rep. 1 4, 84 8 P.2d 694 (Utr 
The second issue raised in ttii. matte .- whether *~\^ trial 
1 
court errea " finding that the law enforcement persc..:r. . 
"rea:- •.-- ..-.- -. •:-^  - ~ make the stop of the Defendant's vehicle 
The trial court's ae:eni^:^ m -'I Ih xisten^e of a reasonable 
suspicion should not ne overturned unless 1.L ..-• cj...u..j.y erroneous 
State j . ^y^„ , uLah Adv. P^n '^S 'Ur ah App . 19i2) . 
The third issue on appeal win-'I t erred in 
denying the Defendant's .Motion to Suppress .:tr eviaence obtained 
fru'ir ill ie veh;"ln. because the Defendant was 
unreasonably decanie 'he appe •• \ai 
ccur1-' p denial <~>f a motion * suppress, reviews L*-C Liiax court's 
finding.. '" r1 v errorless' standard" and the 
trial court's "u^tmiaLc xeyax ^.^.^usions' 3-3 
"unde^ ' «^rror,t*rpr-* standard State v. Lopez, 831 P. 2a 1040, 
: w-t. , , t _ . .4.^ 
The fourth issue is whether th^ trial ^nu:L _ • j 
r
-'.danL'b Mc+- ' ^  ^ Suppress the evidence obtained from the 
waiian:±ess searc) dilate -,oi,r+_ rovi ews 
the trial court's action ;t accordance wni, ie stan-iaix. . n 
ii t; .., i~ SCUT-1' r^ issue number three anove . 
The nil., -.s^ u .- ex red *" *-d™i twiner 
evidence of t* t- Defendant",} ^onfessio;* w. ,^t estab—..-/i" y 
dec. . .deoende^t evidence of the corpus delicti of the crime. 
The appex^at^ .. * -ne trial cc"v"' -n-H-g 
deference tc : he trial court s factual fi:x.ii^ «^ .^ate v^ldon, 
3 • L intah : a-^) 
CONTKUUUXIHG STATUTORY PROVISION" 
There are no controlling statutory provisions that afie,.. 
disposition of this case other than the Utah Rules of Evidence and 
case law cited hereinafter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, Son T. Nguyen, was charged with Receiving 
Stolen Property, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated 76-6-408 (1953 as Amended), in that the Defendant 
allegedly, on or about October 27, 1992, in Utah County, Utah 
received, retained or disposed of another's property knowing that 
it had been stolen, or believing that it probably had been stolen, 
with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, said property having 
a value in excess of $1,000.00. 
The Defendant was convicted by the trial court, sitting 
without a jury of the crime but the court found that the value of 
the property attributed to the Defendant had a value in excess of 
$250.00 but less than $1,000.00, a Third Degree Felony. 
The Appellant appeals his conviction herein. 
PROCEDURAL CHRONOLOGY OF THE CASE 
1. The Information was filed in this matter on November 18, 
1992 (R. 1). 
2. A Preliminary hearing was held on November 17, 1992 and as 
a result thereof, the Defendant was bound over to District Court 
(R. 8-9). 
3. The Defendant entered a Not Guilty plea to the charge at 
his Arraignment which took place on December 9, 1992 (R. 13). 
4. Counsel for the Defendant filed various motions before 
trial. Specifically, Defendant, through counsel, filed a Motion in 
3 
Limine to Suppress Evidence Obtained Without a Search Warrant with 
supportive memorandi ltn 1/1-1^ Motio* ^ ^  T i ^ 1 n ^ *~^ '^xfiude 
e v ;i d 6 * , ' 1 11 11: e I a t e :i ._.-..-. ^ a 
Supplemental Memorandum, in support ct Defendant:' s Motion to 
Supv' — — /r> ""i •'-" • 
^ic, : .led a T'xiuil Brief addressing the issues raised 
by the Defendant's motions (R. 72- 9 1 ) . 
6. "The case came on for trial on J'ain :i,a ;i 5 2 0 1 9 93 before the 
Honorable Gary I I Burmingham, si11ing wi thout a j ui y (R. 93 9 8) . 
7. The trial court, •;*- -se found the 
•"v--r"~- * n ^ ~: 1- * • "vo^1 ' y 
in ciuSSLi^i. LL'JL cGuiQ Jot ciL LI ^ .LUtBc .IAT- . erenciaiiu, naci a vaiue 
greater than $250 L-U: - • r r-^ :. accordingly 
8. The Lria- court, eijiere^
 ft:if. :. findings ^ Fact, 
Conclusions o+~ law ir "i a*-; Order relati na - motions fil^n ^\r the 
9. The coin t set February 24 : z:.~ : : >e for 
pronouncement of Judgment --v ~ Sentence. A1" v^r ^'mo the Defendant 
f 
not: • icre than live years, was ordered to p- / a fine of $1, J^ 0-, 
1 ^ • • r char ere * ? ^  ^  p r • -, * s >f^ s *~ i t nr" ' r ' -i f* 1 n ^  _ "7 ^  u7 ^  " *h 
defendants;. Execution : : •• sentence '/as suspended and the 
Defendant wa? pla^^d on ^mpr^qoH probat~ on for a period of 36 
1 1 obat ion e s t ab1i shed 
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by the trial court and Adult Probation and Parole (R. 124-25) . 
10. The Defendant, through counsel, served and filed a Notice 
of Appeal on March 16, 1993 (R. 127) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Facts Relating to the Theft From 7-11 in Price 
Utah on October 10 or 11, 1992, 
1. The prosecution's witness, Louise Roybal testified that 
she was a clerk at a 7-11 Store located in Price, Utah (Tr. 7, L. 
19 to 8, L. 7). While working the graveyard shift on October 10, 
1992, she observed seven Oriental individuals playing the four or 
five video games located in the store (Tr. 8, L. 19 to 9, L. 13). 
The individuals bought approximately $50.00 worth of merchandise. 
The clerk testified that the Oriental individuals did not leave the 
store together, but in pairs (Tr. 9, L. 23 to 10, L. 11). Louise, 
while cleaning around the machines the next morning, noticed no 
damage of any kind to the machines (Tr. 18, L. 10-19). 
2. Barbara Jean Robinette testified that she was the manager 
of the 7-11 Store in Price as of October 10, 1992. As the result 
of a phone call from her assistant on the morning of October 11, 
1992, she went to the store and discovered that one of the coin 
operated video games was not working. On October 12, 1992, one day 
later, Ms. Robinette discovered that the lock had been cut, a 
circuit board taken from the machine and the coin box emptied (Tr. 
12, L.14 to 16, Line 18). 
3. Officer Tracy Lynn Allred of the Price City Police 
Department testified that he went to the 7-11 Store as a result of 
5 
a ca"!"1 — October 12, 1992 at 9:37 a.m. an* verified that one of 
the video machines bad a lock cue, *•::*. oox emptied and the 
cii ' ' on the 
machine t'Tr . 1 to z* .6) . 
B. Facts Relating to the Incident at the Skyview Cafe in 
Spanis:> t ui *„ ^cixiyoxx on ,*^  ^ WJ^^A. * ., J2 . 
4 , Maxine Barker testified that she was the owner and manager 
of F1' tr"i ev """"-f- located in Soanish Fork Canyon ""> -, \.22 '. o 1:6, 
colored foreig- ulled up, containing Lou.: jiiemai 
i- : - L the ocr,^ir:fn ' Q f f *-'^< ^ r a:-d entered the 
cafe offering to St-^ 1 ur> to t\ 
Ms agreed to buy * r •; . ; ' — ::ty dollars; . The 
i,; * " store w:^u two roixs ^^ ^ ^ ^ e r s ^' ed 
in paper nuii a yex-L_* ^ ^y^^ pad anu L;ie transac 
Ms, Barker had an employee go outside and write down the vehicle's 
1 , ~. - - ' ; -rker then called the 
police and gave tnei.i the information o,^ ., ^^spicious persons had 
tried +• <-* c^: 1 ,p to 32,00C ' A coins :c he1 f:hat had been wrapped 
b. snannoii Ho: „~ , i.. ^ .aiiiy ,^^ ,._. _. ^ .:.je Dispatcher, 
testified r-h^*- Rhonda, another dispatcher,, had received a call and 
< .- ' repared (but not 
brought tji^ ax/ aiaicaL^i^ iiidi ru^ .. . ,,.v.«^.s i n a ci earn 
colored r.->- ran compact cas v-- a designated license plate, were 
\ rter s wr apped :i i i yell ow notebook 
paper. Calls were placed by other Utah County Sheriff's 
dispatchers to businesses in Spanish Fork Canyon and to the 
dispatcher in Price who indicated that thefts had occurred from 
video machines in the area, which information was added to the ATL 
(Attempt to Locate Card) (Tr. 32, L. 24 to 38, L. 10). 
6. Shannon Horn also checked the license plate number and 
found that the car was registered to a Vietnamese person, whose 
license was suspended (Tr. 38, Lines 11 to 20) . Ms. Horn testified 
that the information was accumulated prior to the stop of the 
vehicle Defendant was driving (Tr. 38, Line 17 to 39, L. 19). 
7. Penney Turner, a dispatcher for the Department of Public 
Safety, State of Utah, which includes the Highway Patrol testified 
that she was on the day shift on October 27, 1992. Ms. Turner 
testified that she had received a ATL from the Utah County 
Sheriff's office that morning and that at approximately 10:30 a.m., 
dispatched an ATL on four suspicious Oriental that had left the 
Skyview Cafe trying to sell three to four hundred dollars worth of 
quarters wrapped in yellow paper. Approximately five minutes 
later, Ms. Turner received additional information from the Utah 
County Sheriff's Office that the individuals had just left the 
Little Acorn cafe. At the same time, Ms. Turner was advised that 
the individuals were suspects in vending machine burglaries out of 
Carbon and Emery County (Tr. 42, L. 4 to 49, L. 20). Ms. Turner 
testified that she was in contact with the officer making the stop 
and all of the information accumulated by her relating to the ATL 
had been dispatched to the officer before 10:45 a.m., the time of 
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the traffic stop of the vehicle the Defendant was driving (Tr. 50, 
L. 6 to L. 14) . 
C. Facts Relating to the Traffic Stop of the Vehicle 
the Defendant was Driving, 
8. Mr. Dennis Shields testified that he was a trooper with 
the Utah Highway Patrol and was on patrol during the morning of 
October 27, 1992 (Tr. 55, L. 21 to 56, L. 9) . Officer Shields 
testified that he received an ATL on a white Toyota with Utah 
Plates containing four Oriental individuals that was heading from 
the Little Acorn cafe at the mouth of Spanish Fork Canyon 
northbound. Further, he had been notified that the individuals had 
gone to the Little Acorn to sell rolls of quarters that were 
wrapped up in yellow paper to the owner of the Little Acorn (Tr. 
57, L. 14 to 58, L. 6) . 
9. Officer Shields testified that another Department of 
Transportation unit spotted the car, a tan Toyota with the license 
plate that was given, northbound in the American Fork area (Tr. 58, 
L. 7 to L. 17) . Officer Shields overtook the car himself and as he 
was making the traffic stop, he was informed that representatives 
of Price City wanted to talk to the individuals in connection with 
a burglary in the area (Tr. 58, L. 18 to L. 23) . 
10. Officer Shields identified the Defendant as the driver 
and immediately obtained the keys from the ignition to the car (Tr. 
64, L. 10 to L. 20). Officer Shields then asked the Defendant if 
he had any large amount of quarters wrapped in yellow paper to 
which the Defendant answered, "no" (Tr.59, L. 23 to 60, L. 10) . 
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The officer, after obtaining the Defendant's identification, 
required the Defendant to exit the vehicle (Tr. 60, L. 11 to L.15) . 
The officer asked the Defendant other questions relating to where 
they had been and questions relating to the ownership of the car 
(Tr. 60, L. 20 to 61, L. 25) . Minutes later, Deputy Hill, with the 
Utah County Sheriff's Department took the Defendant back to his 
vehicle (Tr. 62, L. 5 to L. 16; 65, L. 8 to L. 23). 
11. Mr. David Hill testified that he was a Deputy Utah County 
Sheriff and was on duty on October 27, 1992. Deputy Hill received 
the ATL at 9:54 a.m. He testified that it is regular procedure to 
stop a vehicle identified in the ATL and obtain information from 
them, contact the agency the originated the ATL and obtain the 
requested information (Tr.67, L. 7 to 68, L. 18). 
12. Deputy Hill received information in the form of an ATL 
containing similar information that was dispatched to Officer 
Shields (Tr. 68, L. 23 to 72, L. 20). Deputy Hill was located at 
Mountain Springs when he learned that the vehicle in question had 
been stopped by the Utah Highway Patrol. It then took Deputy Hill 
fifteen minutes to arrive at the location in American Fork where 
the Defendant's vehicle had beens stopped (Tr. 72. L. 16 to 73, L. 
3) . 
13. Upon arriving at the scene, Deputy Hill identified the 
Defendant, as the driver and took him back to his vehicle. Deputy 
Hill told the Defendant the circumstances that gave rise to the 
stop and asked the Defendant basic questions relating to the 
ownership of the car and the owner's phone number. The Defendant 
9 
told Deputy Hill that he had no quarters in the car (Tr. 73, L. 22 
to 75, L. 18) . Deputy Hill was unable to testify when the search of 
the vehicle began in relation to the questioning of the Defendant 
(Tr.78, L. 25 to 79, Line 7). Later in his testimony Deputy Hill 
stated that after he had gotten the Defendant in his vehicle and 
explained the reason for the stop, he advised him of his Miranda 
rights from memory (Tr. 104, L. 10 to L. 19). The Defendant was 
asked only if he understood his rights but was not asked if he 
waived his rights (Tr. 104, L.21 to 105, L. 9). 
14. Deputy Hill then interrogated the Defendant about the 
quarters, where the Defendant and the other occupants of the car 
had been and the identity of the owner of the car. The Defendant 
denied having any quarters, indicated that they had been visiting 
a friend in Colorado Springs and that the car was owned by his 
friend, "Bo", whose telephone number he did not know (Tr. 105, L. 
10 to 106, L. 9). 
15. As Deputy Hill was interrogating the Defendant, the 
search of the vehicle the Defendant was driving was conducted by 
other officers, including Dennis Shields (Tr. 106, Lines 7 to 13; 
112, L. 6 to 114, Line 11) . A duffel bag was retrieved from the car 
containing both unrolled and rolled quarters (totaling $2,096.75) 
and a pair of vice grips. A yellow legal pad of paper, bolt cutters 
and screwdrivers were found in other locations in the car (Tr. 106, 
L. 14 to 109, L. 4; 111, Lines 4 to 14). 
D. Facts Relating to the Confession of the Defendant, 
16. Mr. Scott Cater testified that he was a Deputy Utah 
10 
County Sheriff on October 27, 1992, and met with the Defendant at 
the American Fork police station (Tr. 122, L. 18 to 123, L. 5) . 
Deputy Carter was told that another officer had mirandized the 
Defendant and only gave the Defendant a brief reminder of his 
rights. Again, no one asked the Defendant if he waived his rights 
(Tr. 123, Lines 6 to 25) . 
17. The Defendant indicated that he and his companions had 
gone on a three day trip to Colorado, had been involved in four 
burglaries, two in Colorado Springs and two in other unspecified 
locations and that some of the quarters in his possession came from 
those burglaries (Tr. 125, Line 22 to 127, Line 21) . Two days 
later, on October 29, 1992, a written statement, Exhibit 11, was 
taken from the Defendant (Tr. 128, L. 18 to 13 0, L. 22) . The 
Defendant detailed how money had been taken from the coin operated 
machines in 7-11 Stores in Colorado (Tr. 131, L. 5 to 134, L. 16). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court erred 
in admitting evidence of the burglary that occurred in Price, Utah 
on October 10 or 11, 1992, because there is absolutely no evidence 
that links that theft to the Defendant or the evidence in this 
case. 
Secondly, the trial court erred in ruling that the attempt by 
persons in the Defendant's car to exchange quarters for currency, 
without more, was sufficient for the officers involved to form a 
"reasonable suspicion" justifying the stop of the Defendant's car 
on the highway. 
11 
Third, the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the 
Defendant's car on the grounds that the search was without a 
warrant or the consent of the Defendant and the officers lacked the 
requisite factual basis to form the necessary suspicion to 
authorize the search. Additionally, the Defendant was unreasonably 
detained on the roadway and based thereon, the evidence from the 
search should have been suppressed. 
Finally, the court erred in admitting evidence of the 
defendant's statements without clear independent proof of a crime. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE 
BURGLARY IN PRICE, UTAH. 
In reviewing the transcript of the hearing in this matter, the 
intent of the prosecution in introducing the evidence related to 
the alleged theft from the 7-11 Store in Price is perplexing. 
The alleged theft occurred on October 10 or 11, 1992 in Price. 
The Defendant was stopped on October 27, 1992, sixteen days later. 
The theft was not discovered by the 7-11 store manager in Price 
until the morning of October 12, 1992. There is no evidence that 
the seven oriental individuals that wsre seen by the store clerk 
had anything to do with the theft as opposed to other patrons or 
employees of the store. It is unbelievable that the trial court 
would allow the introduction of the evidence based upon the fact 
that seven Oriental individuals happened to visit the site of a 
12 
burglary within forty-eight hours of it's discovery. 
There was no forensic evidence that the bolt cutters, vice 
grips or other tools found in the vehicle driven by the Defendant 
had anything to do with the burglary in Price. Neither the 
Defendant nor the three people traveling with him could be 
identified by the store clerk. In sum, there is not a scintilla of 
evidence that the Defendant had anything to do with the Price 
theft. To allow evidence of other crimes without any foundation 
that the charged Defendant was involved is violative of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and interpreting case law. 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." Rule 401 U.R.E. Further, Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence provides that: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
Admission of evidence under Rule 4 04(b) is a question of law 
and is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. The trial 
court's underlying factual determination should be given deference 
by the appellate court and should only be overruled when they are 
clearly erroneous. State v. O'Neil, 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 848 P. 2d 
694 (Utah App.1993) . In this case, the trial court made no factual 
findings related to the evidence except that the court overruled 
13 
the objections of the defense to it's introduction (Tr. 10, L. 25 
to 11, L. 10; 14, L.24 to 15, L.3; 23, Lines 5 to 8; R. 107-112). 
The fact that seven Oriental individuals were in Price, Utah 
within forty-eight hours of the burglary does not tend to make more 
likely, the assertion that the Defendant who is likewise Oriental, 
committed a crime, especially in light of the fact that the clerks 
failed to identify the Defendant. Further, none of the coins, tools 
or other items found in the car driven by the Defendant related to 
the incident in Price. Accordingly, the evidence is not relevant. 
In reviewing the admission of evidence of a prior bad act, the 
appellate court must find first, that the prior bad act evidence is 
admissible under the provisions of Rule 4 04 (b) , as a matter of law. 
Second, the appellate court must determine as a matter of law, that 
the trial court acted reasonably in striking the balance between 
probative value and prejudice under Rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. If either of the tests are not met, the appellate court 
must determine if the admission of evidence resulted in prejudicial 
error. State v. O'Neil, supra. 
Inasmuch as the evidence could not be linked to the Defendant 
at all, the evidence was improper under the Rule as a matter of 
law. Further to introduce the evidence because quarters were 
involved and because Oriental males were seen in the area is 
tantamount to racism. Video machines are vandalized on a daily 
basis. That fact hardly justifies the introduction of that 
evidence in a case involving a person charged with a similar 
offense when persons of his same race are seen in the area. 
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Obviously, it's introduction was unfairly prejudicial and inasmuch 
as there is no relevance, the introduction of the testimony and 
evidence was error. 
On appeal, this Court must determine whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood, absent the error, of an outcome more 
favorable to the Defendant. Sate v. Hamilton, 827 P. 2d 232, 239-40 
(Utah 1992); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, it is respectfully submitted that the 
introduction of evidence of a crime that was not linked to the 
Defendant, created a false premise for the trial court's ruling 
regarding the propriety of the stop and search of the vehicle the 
Defendant was driving' and the finding of the establishment of the 
corpus delicti. Appellant respectfully submits that the 
introduction was prejudicial and that absent the introduction of 
the evidence, a result more favorable to the Defendant would have 
occurred. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
STOP OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS PROPER. 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Deitman, 
739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) describes the three levels of 
encounters between police and citizens as follows: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize 
a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" 
that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must be 
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temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable 
cause to believe an offense has been committed or 
is being committed. 
Id. , (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 
1984), cert, denied, Hartsel v. United States. 476 U.S. 1142, 106 
S. Ct. 2250 (1986) ) . 
There is no question that when a law enforcement official 
stops a motor vehicle, a "seizure" occurs, giving the participants 
therein the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. State v. 
Holmes. 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah App. 1989). 
As stated by the Court in State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 
(Utah App. 1987), a seizure under the Fourth Amendment must be 
based on specific articulable facts, which, together with rational 
inferences drawn from them, would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a 
crime. 
The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968) required that an officer be able 
to point to "specific and articulable facts which taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion. . . . " 
Utah has codified the requirement of reasonable suspicion in 
Utah Code Annotated 77-7-15 (1990): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or 
is attempting to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation of 
his actions. 
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See also: State v. Deitman, supra. at 617-18. 
In determining the existence of "reasonable suspicion," courts 
are to engage in a totality of the circumstances analysis to 
determine whether there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
conduct. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991), 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989). 
The cases in which this Court has addressed the issue that 
seem to be most applicable to this case are those involving drug 
transactions. In State v. Sykes, supra., the officer stopping the 
defendant motorist was able to articulate the following. Neighbors 
had complained about persons entering and leaving the home the 
defendant visited at all hours; the deputy had purchased cocaine in 
that area himself; there was unspecified information from a 
confidential informant; and, the defendant entered the home and 
left shortly thereafter. Id. at 37. In considering those elements, 
the Court stated: 
None of these factors, either singly or in the 
aggregate, necessarily indicate wrongdoing as 
opposed to innocent action by defendant. 
At the time of the arrest, any connection between 
defendant and illegal activity was purely specu-
lation. The police did not know the identity of the 
owner or occupant of the house, and they did not know the 
defendant. At that point, they had no positive 
evidence linking the house to illegal activity. 
Further, Defendant's mere presence in an area 
suspected to harbor drug activity does not give 
rise to reasonable suspicion that she engaged in 
such activity. 
Id. at 37. 
In State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), the Court 
found that the Defendant's general actions in deplaning from a 
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flight arriving from Los Angeles, similar to a drug carrier, the 
bulge under the Defendant's clothing at waist level and his failure 
to produce identification were inadequate circumstances for the 
officers to have formed a reasonable articulable suspicion. Id. at 
466-67. 
The Court held in State v. Truiillo, supra. at 89-90, that the 
observance of the defendant in a high crime area carrying a nylon 
bag in a "suspicious" manner, did not justify the Defendant's 
detention, in that the totality of circumstances did not constitute 
a reasonable suspicion despite the lateness of the hour, the high 
crime factor in the area and the subsequent nervous behavior of the 
defendant. See also. State v. Steward, Supra.; Lemon v. State, 580 
So.2d 292 (Fla. App. 1991). 
As applied to the facts of this case, the only factors 
identified by the testifying officers were that Oriental male 
individuals were attempting to sell quarters to various businesses 
in Utah County, that the coins were wrapped in legal note paper and 
that a burglary of coin operated machines had occurred in Price, 
Utah. Additionally, the officers testified that the Defendant 
acted nervously (R. 107-112). There is nothing illegal or improper 
in accumulating quarters from personal savings, gambling or regular 
business activities. Additionally, there is nothing improper in 
trying to convert those coins to paper money to accommodate payment 
of bills or expenses. The possession of coins, even in great 
number, is legal. There are many businesses that take coins 
(laundry, video games, food concessions and arcades), as the major 
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percentage of payment by customers. The proprietors of those 
businesses or family members may be paid in quarters or take 
quarters to pay expenses. 
Regardless of the state's attempt to draw the conclusion of 
illegality from it, the accumulation and exchange of quarters is 
legal and is consistent with legal activity. Although the state was 
able to identify the car in question as the car stopping at the 
Skyview Cafe to exchange quarters, there is not a scintilla of 
evidence that connected the burglaries from 7-11 stores to the 
Defendants at the time the stop was made. The officers in Utah 
County had no idea about the specifics of any burglaries when the 
Defendant was stopped other than they had occurred. 
The same logic used by police officers in this case could 
justify seizures from and detentions of our general citizenry. 
Every person taking an item into a pawn shop could be detained, 
questioned and searched because somewhere in Utah there is going to 
be a reported theft of that item (even though it may have occurred 
weeks ago) . Although it's possession may not be illegal, the same 
rationale could be used to justify the seizure because it might be 
related to the theft. Garage sales, newspaper want-ads could create 
the same suspicion as the conduct of the Defendant in this case. 
As in the cases previously decided by the Court, there are a 
large number of items missing from the officer's testimony in this 
case. First, there is no evidence linking the Defendant by name or 
specific description (other than he is Oriental) to any previous 
wrongdoing. Second, there was no evidence that the accumulation of 
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quarters by the defendants and his companions was equivalent to 
criminal behavior. The police did not have any knowledge of the 
Defendant prior to the stop. The Court's previous analysis of the 
facts of the cases cited herein mandate that the Court conclude 
that there was not a reasonable suspicion justifying the stop of 
the vehicle Defendant was driving. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS BASED UPON THE DEFENDANT'S 
UNREASONABLE DETENTION. 
It is clear that the Defendant, who had the owner's permission 
to drive the vehicle had the required permissive and possessory 
control of the car to contest a lengthy detention and warrantless 
automobile search. State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App. 
1991) . 
The case law in Utah relating to the scope of detention has 
developed over the last few years. It is clear that an officer may 
stop a vehicle incident to a traffic offense. State v. Lopez, 831 
P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 
157-58 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah 
App. 1992); State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992). 
Further, the length and scope of a police officer's detention must 
be "strictly tied to and justified by 'the circumstances which 
rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P. 2d 
761, 763 (Utah 1991); State v. Hansen, 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28 
(Utah App. 1992). 
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The specific guidelines were established in State v. 
Sepulveda, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 69 (Utah App. 1992) : 
Utah courts have determined "an officer conducting 
a routine traffic stop may request a driver's 
license and vehicle registration, conduct a com-
puter check, and issue a citation." [Citing cases] 
The officer may also check for outstanding warrants 
"so long as it does not significantly extend the 
period of detention." [Citing cases] However, once 
the occupants of the vehicle have satisfied the reasons 
for the initial stop, the officer must permit them to 
proceed. [Citing case]"Any further temporary detention 
for investigative questioning after the fulfillment 
of the purpose for the initial traffic stop is justi-
fied under the fourth amendment only if the detaining 
officer has reasonable suspicion of serious criminal 
activity."[Citing case] (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 71. 
In State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), the 
officer effected a vehicle stop. After receiving the driver's 
valid driver's license and registration, learning that the van had 
been borrowed to go fishing, determined that the van was not 
reported stolen, and issuing a citation, the officer detained the 
defendant based upon his observation of a homemade bed, two gym 
bags, and a fishing pole. Based upon the consent of the driver, 
the officer searched the van. In addressing the question of 
whether the officer's continued detention constituted a seizure in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, stated that the proper inquiry 
was, 
Whether the officer's action was justified at its 
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified it in the 
first place. 
Id. 
The Court determined that the defendant's nervousness, failure 
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to make eye contact, improper clothing and equipment for the 
weather and failure to produce evidence of permission to use the 
vehicle were insufficient to justify the roadside detention and 
questioning. Id. at 436. The Court held that the detention and 
request to search after the purposes of the initial stop had been 
accomplished was a violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights. Id. at 437. 
In State v. Lovegren, 829 P. 2d 155 (Utah App. 1992) , the Court 
was faced with a situation where an officer had pulled a motorist 
over for a traffic violation. The defendant was wearing sunglasses 
and the vehicle was cluttered. The officer asked and received 
permission to search the vehicle, ultimately producing a controlled 
substance. On appeal the Court held that the cluttered condition 
of the car and bloodshot eyes were not indicative of criminal 
behavior and the request to search the vehicle was improper. Id. at 
158. See also. State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). 
In applying the facts of this case to the prior decisions of 
the Utah Appellate Courts, it is necessary to determine the reason 
for the traffic stop. Deputy Hill testified that when an Attempt 
to Locate is received on a particular vehicle, the procedure is to, 
"stop the vehicle and obtain the information from them, contact the 
agency that originated the ATL, and find out information that they 
would like us to." (Tr. 68, Lines 13 to 18). 
The Defendant was pulled over by Patrolman Shields who 
immediately, took the keys to the car from the ignition. The 
Defendant was asked to exit and vehicle and Patrolmen Shields 
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informed the Defendant why he had stopped him and asked him if he 
had large amounts of quarters. The Defendant responded that he did 
not. Additionally, the Defendant indicated that he had not been 
through Price. Aside from obtaining the Defendant's driver's 
license, no other efforts were taken by the patrolman to elicit any 
further information. (Tr. 59, Line 15 to 61, Line 4). 
Deputy Hill testified that it took him fifteen minutes to 
arrive at the scene after the Defendant's vehicle was stopped (Tr. 
73, Lines 1 to 3) . It is clear that the Defendant was simply being 
detained at the scene awaiting the arrival of more officers. Once, 
the Defendant was taken away from the car, the officers commenced 
a warrantless search of the car without the permission of the 
Defendant. 
There is no question that Patrolman Shields obtained the 
information required by the ATL including all relevant data on the 
Defendant and where he had been traveling. The detention of the 
vehicle and the Defendant thereafter was unreasonable and outside 
the scope of the purpose of the stop. The law enforcement officers 
gathered no evidence of any kind to bolster a claim of illegal 
behavior. There was nothing irregular about the Defendant's 
license, the car was not reported stolen, and the officers did not 
observe anything about the car upon which further detention could 
be justified or upon which the search could be based. 
Again, all the State produced to justify the stop and the 
length of the detention was information that the Defendant or a 
person in his vehicle was trying to exchange quarters wrapped in 
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notebook paper for currency at various businesses in Utah County. 
The attempt to elevate the unrelated burglary in Price that 
occurred sixteen days before to some kind of exigent circumstance, 
justifying the detention of the Defendant is asinine. As detailed 
in the Statement of Facts, all that was really obtained relating to 
Carbon County, before the traffic stop, from the officials in 
Price, was there had been "thefts and burglaries and vending 
machines [sic] where quarters had been taken" (Tr. 37, Lines 6 to 
10) . The leap to the conclusion that persons in Price wanted to 
talk to the Defendant is absolutely unsupported by any testimony in 
the Transcript by a person that talked to Carbon County officials. 
Specifically, Finding of Fact number 3, to the extent it isolates 
the conversation with Carbon County to the burglary at the 7-11 in 
Price on October 10 or 11, is completely unsubstantiated by the 
testimony (R. Ill) 
All that was known is set out above and none of that 
information linked the defendant to any crime or illegal behavior 
and the record is clear that there was nothing about his driving, 
registration or the inside of the car that justified the detention. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS BASED UPON THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE, 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (Utah 
1978) adopted the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), allowing the warrantless 
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search of an automobile where the law enforcement officers possess 
probable cause for the search and there are exigent circumstances 
justifying the warrantless search. 
As detailed in the previous point, there was no probable cause 
for the traffic stop or the detention of the Defendant. It follows 
that absent any evidence at that juncture, there can be no 
justification of the warrantless search. 
The possession of quarters is legal. The exchange of quarters 
for currency is legal. The stop, detention and search of a vehicle 
based upon one call by a dispatcher to a Carbon County dispatcher 
that a number of thefts and burglaries had occurred involving 
quarters is not reason to stop all persons having quantities of 
quarters in their possession. Again, there was no information 
communicated from Carbon County that, at the time of the stop, even 
indicated the involvement of Oriental males, let alone the 
Defendant or the other occupants of the car; or, a citing of the 
vehicle he was driving in the area of a burglary; or even a time 
reference on when the crimes were supposedly committed. A review 
of the trial court's Findings indicates only one paragraph, 
relating to the commission of a crime and that is Paragraph 3 which 
is totally vague, ambiguous and devoid of any relationship to the 
Defendant (R. Ill). 
The Defendant submits that any claim to probable cause is 
simply not substantiated in the record and the evidence from the 
search should be suppressed. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION BASED UPON THE ABSENCE 
OF INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE. 
The Defendant contends that the trial court allowed evidence 
of his confession to be introduced before sufficient independent 
evidence of a crime was introduced. Utah law on the subject is 
established by State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 314 P.2d 353 (Utah 
1957). 
In that case the Court noted that the "rule is quite universal 
that an extrajudicial confession, by itself, is not sufficient to 
sustain a conviction of a crime, but there must be evidence, 
independent of the confession to establish the corpus delicti." Id 
at 354. The rule established in the English common law was to 
prevent the conviction of the innocent on the strength of false 
confessions. Id. at 354. 
In defining a test to describe the quantum of proof necessary 
to establish the crime and satisfy the requirement, the Court 
stated: 
Although they vary, it seem quite generally agreed 
that the evidence of the corpus delicti need not 
be "beyond reasonable doubt," "conclusive" or 
"sufficient to warrant a conviction," independent 
of other evidence. From a perusal of such authorities 
it seem to us, that the generally accepted view, to 
which we give our approval, is that the evidence 
independent of the confession need not establish the 
corpus delicti by separate, full or positive proof, 
and that the whole evidence, including the confession, 
may be considered together in determining whether 
the corpus delicti has been satisfactorily established 
. . . . (Emphasis added) 
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Id. at 356. Justice Crockett then stated that the rule to be 
employed is that there must "be independent, clear and convincing 
evidence of the corpus delicti. . . . " Id. at 357. See also. 
State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 275 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954). 
The standard set out above raises the inquiry as to whether, 
independent of the confession, there was independent, clear and 
convincing evidence of the crime. The fact is that there was no 
evidence of a crime to which the Defendant can be linked. As set 
out above, there is not one scintilla of evidence that links the 
Defendant to the burglary of the 7-11 Store in Price, other than he 
is Oriental. No one can place the Defendant at the 7-11 or in the 
area. The store clerk could not identify him, the car or the other 
occupants. No one has been able to determine the origin of the 
quarters as coming from a particular spot and the tools found in 
the car cannot be linked forensically to any crime. There is 
simply no evidence of a crime or that the quarters were stolen. 
It is respectfully submitted that there was no independent 
evidence of the crime. 
CONCLUSION 
The testimony in this case establishes that the trial court 
allowed evidence of the burglary in Price to inundate every aspect 
of the Defendant's trial. The evidence concerning the 7-11 
burglary should never have been introduced because of a total lack 
of foundation linking the crime or the individuals spotted 
therein to the Defendant or his companions. Yet the burglary that 
occurred sometime during a forty-eight hour period, sixteen days 
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before the Defendant was stopped was allowed into evidence to 
establish a prior bad act of the Defendant and the supposed basis 
for a vehicular stop, detention and search. The evidence should 
have been excluded and it's absence leaves a void of any evidence 
establishing cause to stop, search and detain the Defendant. 
The trial court erred in finding that there was a reasonable 
suspicion for the stop, the detention and a search of the vehicle. 
The evidence obtained should have been suppressed. 
Finally, there was no independent evidence of a crime, apart 
from the confession and the conviction on that basis, should be 
reversed. 
Dated this 3d day of November, 1993. 
^2-,—Z±(^ 4^ f**fr&~ 
Steven B. Killpc 
:torney for Defendant/Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that four (4) copies of the Appellant's Brief were 
mailed to Jan Graham, Attorney General, 23 6 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, on this 3d> day of November, 1993. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH/ : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
SON T. NGUYEN# : Case No. 921400546 FS 
Defendant(s). : Judge Guy R. Burningham 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Guy R. 
Burningham presiding on the 20th day of January, 1993. The 
Defendant was present in person and represented by Attorney Cleve 
Hatch. The Plaintiff was represented by Deputy Utah County 
Attorney, James R. Taylor. The matter was tried to the bench and 
the Court considered the Defendant's various Motions in Limine and 
to Suppress Evidence. The Court being fully advised in the 
premises does hereby make and enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 27, 1992, Maxine Barker, the owner/manager of 
a restaurant in Spanish Fork Canyon observed a small car described 
as a Datsun or Toyota, cream or tan in color, occupied by five 
Asian individuals as it pulled up to her restaurant. One of the 
individuals came in and offered to sell her quarters. He indicated 
that he had two to three hundred rolls of quarters- Mrs. Barker 
purchased a couple of rolls which were wrapped in yellow notebook 
paper and obtained the license number of the Toyota car as it drove 
away. Shortly after the individuals left Mrs. Barker went to a 
telephone and called Utah County Dispatch and provided all of this 
information. 
2. Utah County Dispatchers in cooperation with patrol 
officers determined that shortly after the incident with Mrs. 
Barker additional attempts to sell quarters were made at two more 
businesses west of the first restaurant in Spanish Fork Canyon. 
3. Dispatchers contacted Price and were told that Price 
Police were investigating a recent burglary and theft involving 
large numbers of quarters from a video arcade machine. 
4. Dispatchers ran a computer check on the license number 
provided and determined that the registered owner of the vehicle 
had a Vietnamese name and had a suspended driver's license. 
5. Dispatchers broadcast an "ATL" (attempt to locate) to 
patrol officers including the Utah County Sheriff and local police 
departments and contacted Highway Patrol dispatch. 
6. The information was dispatched to Highway Patrol officers 
and Department of Transportation vehicles. 
7. Shortly thereafter a small Toyota with the same license 
plate number occupied by four Asian individuals was observed 
northbound on Interstate 15. Highway Patrol troopers and other law 
enforcement agencies responded and the vehicle was stopped just 
west of American Fork on Interstate 15. 
8. A Utah Highway Patrol trooper approached the car and spoke 
with the driver who was the Defendant, Son t. Nguyen. The 
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Defendant denied having any quarters in the car or any knowledge of 
any incident in Price or Spanish Fork Canyon. 
9. The Defendant was not the registered owner of the car. 
Although he stated that the registered owner was a friend he was 
unable to give a full name, address, or phone number. 
10. Officers opened the trunk of the automobile and 
discovered a bag containing a large number of quarters, some 
wrapped in yellow notebook paper. Officers also found bolt cutters 
and tools in a separate bag in the trunk and additional rolls of 
quarters in the passenger compartment of the car. 
11. The Defendant was advised of his miranda rights, which he 
waived, and conversed with Deputy Dave Hill at the scene 
demonstrating an ability to speak and understand the English 
language. 
12. The quarters were taken into evidence and counted when it 
was determined that there was a total of $2,096.75 in quarters. 
13. The Defendant was taken to American Fork Police 
Department where he was again advised of his miranda rights and 
questioned by Detective Scott Carter of the Utah County Sheriff's 
Office after indicating that he was willing to waive his rights and 
speak without an attorney. 
14. The Defendant admitted to Detective Carter that he had 
been in Colorado with his friends and that they had burglarized 
several 7-11 stores. The Defendant stated that the quarters had 
been taken from video arcade games in the 7-11 stores. The 
Defendant stated that he thought there were approximately $550.00 
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worth of quarters. 
15. The Defendant was again interviewed several days later by 
Detective Carter. The Defendant executed a written waiver of his 
miranda rights and wrote and signed a confession which was accepted 
into evidence. 
16. The written statement of the Defendant was as follows: 
They borrow the car let drove it to Co. Spring 2 7eleven 
when we frist got in to C.S. then we rent a motel 2 
nights and after that we hit 4 more 7eleven then we drove 
to denver to eat and then drove home. We took quarters 
from the machine. I was with Monk, long, nam, nam. 
During the same interview the Defendant described to Detective 
Carter in detail how the burglaries would be performed. He stated 
that a group of individuals, all oriental, would go into the stores 
which were always 7-11's. They would play the video machines for 
a period of time until the clerk was no longer interested. They 
would then cut off the lock and completely remove the box for 
catching coins and simply walk out of the store with the stolen 
quarters and equipment. 
16. On October 10, 1992, a 7-11 in Price was burglarized. At 
approximately 2:00 a.m. seven oriental individuals entered the 
store and began playing video games which they did for 
approximately forty minutes. The individuals then left and the 
clerk didn't notice anything wrong with the video machine. At the 
beginning of the next shift it was noticed that the video machine 
was blank and not operating. The owner checked the machine and 
discovered that the lock to the coin box had been cut, the door to 
the coin collection box pried opened and the coin box removed. The 
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Price City Police were called to the 7-11 and an official report 
was taken and an investigation started. 
17. It was stipulated that the bolt cutters seized in the car 
the Defendant was driving was excluded as having cut the lock on 
the 7-11 in Price. 
18. The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on or 
about October 27, 1992, in Utah County the Defendant retained the 
property of another person knowing the property had been stolen or 
believing that it probably had been stolen with the purpose to 
deprive the owner of the property and the property was cash or 
coins with the value of more than $250.00 but less than $1,000.00. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The initial stop of the automobile being driven by the 
Defendant was lawful being based upon reasonable suspicion that the 
Defendant or the occupants of the car were involved in video 
burglaries in the Price area or that the occupants of the car 
contained evidence which may have been relevant to the Price 
investigation. 
2. The detention of the Defendant and the other passengers of 
the car did not exceed the scope of the initial stop. 
3. The warrantless search of the automobile was based upon 
probable cause and exigent circumstances. More specifically, a 
reasonable person in viewing the evidence available to the officers 
could have concluded that it was likely that the automobile 
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contained evidence relevant to a burglary or theft of coins in the 
Price area. Inasmuch as the potential evidence was in an 
automobile traveling away from the suspected crime and the best 
information available indicated that the occupants were in the 
midst of actively disposing of potential evidence, there were 
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search. 
4. Although the evidence independent of the Defendant's 
confession by itself does not establish the corpus delicti of the 
crime charged when considered together with the confession the 
Court believes that there is substantial separate evidence of the 
corpus delicti such that reasonable minds could believe that the 
crime was a real one which was in fact committed and not one which 
was fanciful or imaginary. 
5. The Defendant's confession was freely and voluntarily made 
following an appropriate waiver of his rights to counsel as 
required by Miranda. 
6. The Defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense of 
Theft By Receiving, a Third Degree felony. 
DATED this day of January, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CLEVE HATCH 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
JAMES R. TAYLOR #3199 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH# : 
O R D E R 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
SON T. NGUYEN, : Case No. 921400546 FS 
Defendant(s). : Judge Guy R. Burningham 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Guy R. 
Burningham presiding on the 20th day of January, 1993. The 
Defendant was present in person and represented by Attorney Cleve 
Hatch. The Plaintiff was represented by Deputy Utah County 
Attorney, James R. Taylor. The Court having made and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is hereby ORDERED: 
1. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence grounded in 
the stop of the car and the search is denied. 
2. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress the confession of the 
Defendant based upon a claim that he did not waive his Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel is denied. 
3. The Defendant's Motion to exclude the Defendant's 
confession pursuant to the corpus delicti rule is denied. 
4. The Defendant's Motion in Limine to exclude evidence on 
the grounds of relevance is denied. 
5. The Court adjudges that the Defendant is guilty of 
retaining another person's property on or about October 27, 1992, 
in Utah County, knowing that the property had been stolen or 
believing that the property probably had been stolen with the 
purpose to deprive the owner where the property had a value in 
excess of $250.00 but less than $1,000.00 in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 76-6-408, a Third Degree felony. 
6. The matter is referred to the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole for the preparation of a presentence 
investigation. The Defendant is ordered to be present on the 17th 
day of February, 1993, at the hour of 8:00 o'clock a.m. for the 
purpose of sentencing. Bail shall remain as previously ordered. 
DATED this day of January, 1993 
BY THE COURT: 
GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CLEVE HATCH 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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